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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study attempts to probe how reporting shaped perception of
the Vietnam War with special reference to the watershed series of
battles, commonly known as the Tet offensive of January, 1968.

A

further analysis and evaluation of media coverage for classroom use in
formal schooling follows.
The author's interviews of ten top journalists concerning the
Tet offensive are at the core of the study supplemented by an analysis
of a seminal set of interviews of jourjnalists conducted by Thomas R.
Morgan in July 1984 on the Vietnam War.
This treatment is further reflected in additional analysis of
the replies given by journalists in 1987 to William McCloud's query
"What Should We Tell Our Children About Vietnam" as recounted in
American Herita~e.

Relevant approaches from an extensive curriculum

project entitled "Teaching the Vietnam War" as described and proposed in
extenso in Social Education for 1988 are also discussed with particular
reference to and emphasis upon the Tet offensive in the context of the
Vietnam War in American history textbooks.
Truth can be highly elusive, and especially in war.

Vietnam now

is regarded as an uncensored war, a war where journalists generally
could compete against each other for news.
1
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A few definitions may be in order here.
Journalism?
news.

Essentially, it is the reporting and writing of

And good journalism has been described as the "first draft of

history."

Others often have called it "instant history."

Too, it is a

recording of factual events.
News?

Virtually every journalism textbook carries a definition.

One definition developed by the author over thirty-five years is this:
"That which is most meaningful and significant to the largest number of
people at a given time."
News?

David Brinkley of ABC once gave this definition:

is what we say it is."

"News

Some would disagree, as I do, with this

definition and claim that Brinkley is too superficial and shallow.
The reporting, writing and editing of news is a highly complex,
but usually successful, operation--whether on TV, radio or in
newspapers.
Stephens and Lanson in their text, Writin&
several generally accepted news determinants.

& Reportin&,

list

Included are:

•Impact
•Controversy
•Weight
•Emotion
•Uniqueness
•Prominence
•Proximity
•Timeliness
•Currency
•Educational Value. 1
All of these criteria are in various ways kept in focus for the
journalists interviewed in this study.
A prefatory comment seems perenially true as well.
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War indeed is hell, and war is to be avoided at virtually any
cost.

The late U.S. Senator Hiram Johnson in 1917 said:

"The first

casualty when war comes is truth."
That quote is from Phillip Knightley's book, The First Casualty
which traced the role of the reporter-correspondent from the Crimean War
through Vietnam. 2
Dan Oberdorfer in his powerful book TET wrote both accurately
and hauntingly.

The book's frontispiece is worth quoting:

DEDICATION
For Those Who Died (January 29-March 31, 1968)
3,895 officers and men of the United States Army, Air Force,
Navy and Marine Corps.
214 officers and men of the Republic of Korea & Forces, Vietnam;
the Australian Force, Vietnam; the New Zealand Army Force, Vietnam;
and the Royal Thai Military Assistance Group, Vietnam.
4,954 officers and men of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
( South Vietnam) .
58,373 officers and men of the Vietnam People's Army (north
Vietnam) and the South Vietnam People's Liberation Armed Forces
(Viet Cong).
14,300 civilian men, women and children of South Vietnam.
And Those Who Live and Learn. 3
The book's afterword is also worth quoting:
The Tet Offensive was a dramatic and important event which
clearly required a reconsideration of the strategy being followed.
It caused the participants on all sides of the war to take a second
look at their positions. In the United States Tet provided a
rationale for turning around rather than going ever deeper into a
war the nation was unwilling to pay for and many of its young men
were unwilling to die for.
In bewildering and awkward fashion, the
people and private leadership of the United States made up their
minds about the war at Tet, and they communicated their views
forcefully to those in high public office. A democratic corrective
was applied to a policy gone wrong--but only after terrible wounds
had been inflicted which are likely to scar the nation for a
generation.
It has been said that war is a series of mistakes, and in this
perspective it is fitting that the mistakes of the United States
should take their toll in the United States. What has been done to
Vietnam and the Vietnamese is another question. No matter which
Vietnamese ultimately "win" this proxy war of the great powers, they
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will have lost more than they have gained. Whoever wins must set
about in his own way to bind up the wounds of a ravaged and divided
nation, to salvage what is left of a way of life, to restore the old
villages, the old pagodas and the old ways and to deal with the new
cities and a new generation.
The rice fields and fruit orchards are
fertile and the people are resilient. They will find a way to deal
with the past and the future, with or without our help.
In the end
it will be a Vietnamese solution, and we will probably never
understand how it was reached.
By then our nation, long since sick
of the war, will have lost all interest in the outcome and will
wonder why so many of our young men died so far away for a cause so
few could name.
After this dark age of Vietnamese history, those who survive
could justly repeat to us, with reproach, the message presented by
their forefathers to the first group of French sailqrs who ventured
up the Saigon River a century ago, during the earliest stage of the
European conquest.
"Your country belongs to the western seas, ours
to the eastern," the proclamation said.
"As the horse and the
buffalo differ, so do we--in language, literature, customs.
If you
persist in putting the torch to us, disorder will be long.
But we
shall act according to the laws of heaven, and our cause will
triumph in the end. 4
War is controversy.

War is conflict and therefore news.

Often,

much news.
This paper is aimed directly at examining the educational value
of the extensive news coverage of Tet in the context of the Vietnam War.
News reporting reaches the highest level of professionalism when it is
neutral, objective and non-partisan.
The primary function of reporters is to be fact-finders.
at the heart, indeed of their very right to perform their craft.

It is
The

reader, then, of a news story, about Tet or anything else, should
ideally come away from the story without any idea of the religion,
political beliefs or anything about the personal beliefs or background
of the reporter.
The primary role of a reporter simply is to tell it like it is.
There is little latitude, then, for a liberal or conservative view of a
military battle.

The neutrality of the reportage should be at the core
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of whether a teacher or scholar can trust the work to use it in a
classroom or in research.
The crux of this dissertation rests upon allegations by Peter
Braestrup in the introduction to his Bi~ Story:
Before and during Tet, as will be seen . . . Lyndon Johnson, willynilly, helped to create conditions that led to an unusual failure in
U.S. crisis journalism.
Six months prior to the Tet attacks, he
orchestrated a "progress" campaign; to shore up public support, he
and his subordinates presented an optimistic view of the
Administration's limited war of attrition in Vietnam.
Shortly
before the Tet attacks, he received word from Saigon that Hanoi was
planning a major battlefield effort of some sort; he did not warn
the American people, but rather stressed his quest for "peace."
When the Tet attacks came, he confined his initial reaction to a
hastily called untelevised news conference several days later.
He
left the detailed explanations to subordinates. Amid the clamor of
an election year, he took no retaliatory actions, e.g., more
bombings or mining; instead he hunkered down, besieged, apparently
trying to buy time. Finally, on March 31, he addressed the nation,
announcing a new bombing pause, a new peace offer, and his
withdrawal from the 1968 presidential race.
For two months, he had
left a vacuum--which others hastened to fill.
Simply to describe
the alarms and distortions of the TV and the press in FebruaryMarch 1968, as "deliberate" or "ideological" ignores both poor
Administration performance and the President's own failure to
respond decisively to the sudden turn of events in Vietnam.
Possibly owing to the deep contradictions in his own "guns and
butter" war policy, Johnson did not give the news media (or the
public) a coherent scenario.
In that sense, the President's
political crisis in Washington after Tet was a self-inflicted
wound. 5
A key purpose of this dissertation is a direct analysis of the
coverage and presentation of answers from experts.

Those interviewed

for this dissertation were selected because of their excellent reporting
achievements.
While the author did not report from Vietnam, he encountered
many of the war correspondents reported during a 30-year career here in
the United States.
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The men and women interviewed generally have been praised for
their professionalism and craftmanship.
The following basic questions were asked of all those
interviewed for this dissertation:

*

1.

Was the news coverage of the Tet military action reliable enough
to be used by future teachers, students, and historians? If
not, why not?

2.

Was there accurate enough coverage during Tet of President
Johnson and his administration in Washington, D.C. and in
Vietnam? If not, why not?

3.

What mistakes were made during Tet by the news media in Vietnam
and Washington?

4.

Was Peter Braestrup accurate in his accusations of President
Johnson's alleged "willy-nilly" conduct before and during Tet?

5.

Are the available radio, TV tapes and news accounts, periodicals
and books on Tet accurate enough for use today by students,
teachers and scholars? If not, why not?
The study also proposes to assess with the advantage of

additional perspective the ways in which textbooks, among other
materials, reflected the accuracy and legitimacy of the news coverage.
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CHAPTER I NOTES

1Mitchell Stephens and Gerald Lanson, Writin& and Reportin& (New
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1986), 67-77.
2 Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich, 1976), frontispiece.
3oon Oberdorfer, TET! (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1971),
frontispiece.
4 Ibid., 334-35.
5Peter Braestrup, The Bi& Story (New Haven: Yale University
Press, abridged ed., 1977), xii-xiii, xvii-xviii.

CHAPTER II
WHY TET AND WHY VIETNAM?
Relevant Inquiry into the Evolvement of
the Vietnam War and TET
Tet impacted the entire world with a fury in early 1968.

It was

to be an effort for a final victory, somehow, for the Communists.

It

was to be a sign of valiant defense, courage and great determination for
the Free World.
It was not to be a time of half-measures for either side.
It is also necessary to extensively reexamine the history of the
entire region.

The following serves to help explain that history.

The Tet offensive needs to be examined in an historical context.
It cannot be isolated alone in a 1968 time frame.

There were major

developments both before and after the military battles.
It should be noted here that there were these pertinent
preliminary incidents in December, 1967, and they should be considered a
part of the brief chronology of Tet.

First, General Earle Wheeler,

chairman of the J.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned publicly, on December
18, 1967, in Detroit of a possible enemy offensive.

It was two days

later on December 20, 1967, General Westmoreland privately told
officials in Washington that the Communists had decided to try an allout win-the-war effort throughout South Vietnam.
President Johnson was unpredictable in his behavior.
8

He
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privately told Australian officials at the White House on December 21,
1967, that he expected "kamikaze attacks" but, later, in publicly
discussing Vietnam fails to mention "kamikaze attacks."
Peter Braestrup, in his book, Big Story. used the following as a
brief chronology of the Tet period from January through March 31, 1968:
Jan. 20:
Jan. 22:
Jan. 23:
Jan. 29:
Jan. 30:
Jan. 31:
Feb.
Feb.

1:
2:

Feb.

7:

Feb. 8:
Feb. 18:
Feb. 24:
Feb. 25:
Feb. 27:
Feb. 28:

Mar.
Mar.

1:
6:

Mar. 10:
Mar. 11:
Mar. 12:
Midmonth:
Mar. 16:

Siege of Khe Sahn begins.
General Westmoreland tells NBC he expects major enemy
effort around Tet holidays.
North Koreans seize U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo.
Tet holiday cease fire begins. Saigon's troops on 50
percent holiday leave. Curfew lifted.
Communists launch surprise attacks in II corps, hit Da
Nang and Hai An in I corps.
Attacks throughout South Vietnam, including the Ben Tre,
Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Air Base, the U.S. Embassy, and the
Presidential Palace.
General Westmoreland predicts more enemy attacks.
President Johnson says Tet offensive was a military
offensive, but predicts more hard fighting.
Communists occupy the Lang Vei outpost near the Khe Sahn
and continue battling in Hue and the outskirts but have
withdrawn from other areas.
Senator Robert Kennedy assails Johnson's policy.
Communists gunners shell 45 cities and bases.
Hue cleared of enemy forces.
Westmoreland is optimistic during AP interview, but says
he may need additional forces in the future.
CBS's Walter Cronkite, in a special report, says
negotiation is the only way to conclude the war.
General Wheeler, after a Saigon trip, presents a complex
206,000 troop request. Johnson orders a task force under
incoming Defense Secretary Clark Clifford to study it.
The Congress and the Johnson administration are divided
on the war.
Last Communist push at Khe Sahn is fought back.
General Wheeler cables Westmoreland that it is almost
impossible that troop increase will be allowed.
New York Times reports exclusively that Westmoreland
asked for 206,000 men "to regain the initiative." Frank
McGee of NBC reports U.S. is losing the war.
Newsweek magazine calls for peace and runs "Agony of Khe
Sahn" feature.
Senator Eugene McCarthy wins 42 percent of Democratic
primary vote in New Hampshire.
UPI reports that heavy bombing causes communists to pull
back forces around Khe Sahn.
Robert F. Kennedy announces candidacy for President.
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Mar. 21:
Mar. 22:
Mar. 30:
Mar. 31:

Thieu announces 185,000-man Army increase.
President Johnson announces Westmoreland will become Army
Chief of Staff in mid-1968.
President Johnson is at an all-time low in public
approval for his performance, according to a Gallup poll.
President Johnson gives first nationwide TV speech since
Tet: he announces partial bombing pause, willingness to
negotiate with Hanoi, and his decision not to run for
reelection. 1

Study of this calendar enables one to focus on both causes and
effects.

Any examination of Tet coverage should be balanced against the

reportage of past wars and the entire Vietnam war itself.
It is not the purpose here to review or analyze the entire war,
but Tet can be evaluated for what it did and did not do.
Stanley Karnow's Vietnam:
to The Bi~ Story.

A History can be used as a supplement

Karnow provides a chronicle of Vietnam.

To avoid

duplication, the author has deleted in the following those incidents
relating to Tet that Braestrup used.

Chronolo&y of Vietnam
208 B.C.

Trieu Da, a renegade Chinese general, conquers Au Lac in
the northern mountains of Vietnam, established a capitol,
and proclaims himself emperor of "Nam Viet."

1st century
B.C.

Han dynasty expands and incorporates Nam Viet into the
Chinese empire as the province of Giao Chi.

A.D. 40

Trung sisters lead insurrection against the Chinese and set
up an independent state.

967

Emperor Dinh Bo Linh ascends throne, calling his state Dai
Co Viet. Period of independence follows.

1428

The Chinese recognize Vietnam's independence by signing an
accord after nearly a decade of revolt led by Emperor Le
Loi.

1460-98

Le Thanh Tong rules Vietnam. Introduces comprehsnsive
legal code and other reforms; extends dominion southward.
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1545

Civil strife roils Vietnam, splitting the country for
nearly two centuries.

1627

Alexandre de Rhodes, French missionary adapts Vietnamese
language to Roman alphabet. Paves way for further French
influence in Vietnam.

1772

Start of Tayson rebellion. Ruling Nguyen clan unseated.
French missionary activity spreads.

1787

Pigneau De Behaine, French missionary, enlists support of
Louis XVI to help a pretender to the throne. Nguyen Anh,
regain control. France agrees to send men and material in
exchange for exclusive commercial privileges, but later
reneges.

1802

Gia Long (Nguyen Anh) becomes emperor of Vietnam and
unifies the country.

1820

Captain John White of Salem, Massachusetts, is first
American to set foot in Vietnam.

1843

Permanent French fleet deployed in Asian waters.

1847

Clash between French forces and Vietnamese mandarins in the
city of Tourane, now Danang. Tu Due ascends throne with
plans to eliminate Christianity in Vietnam.

1861

French forces capture Saigon.

1862

Tu Due signs treaty with French granting them broad
religious, economic, and political concessions.

1863

French control extends to Cambodia.

1878

French inroads into Tonkin begin.

1879

Cochinchina's first French civilian governor is appointed.

1883

France establishes a "protectorate" over Annam and Tonkin,
and rules Cochinchina as a colony.

1887

France creates Indochinese Union composed of Cochinchina,
Annam, Tonkin, and Cambodia.

1890

Ho Chi Minh is born in central Vietnam.

1911

Ho leaves Vietnam, not to return for thirty years.

1918

Ho Chi Minh, then known as Nguyen Ai Quoc, arrives in
Paris; remains there for next seven years.
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1919

Ho tries to petition President Woodrow Wilson, at the
Versailles peace conference, for self-determination in
Vietnam.

1920
1924

Ho joins newly formed French Communist party in December.
Ho leaves Paris for Moscow, becomes full-time Communist
agent. Later goes to Canton as assistant to Mikhail
Borodin, Soviet representative in China.

1930

Ho and comrades form Indochinese Communist Party in Hong
Kong.

1932

Bao Dai, theoretically emperor since 1925, returns to
Vietnam from school in France to ascend throne under French
tutelage.

1936

Popular Front government in France sponsors short-lived
liberal reforms in Vietnam.

1941

Ho returns to Vietnam covertly, forms the Vietminh to fight
both Japan and France.

1944

Vo Nguyen Giap forms Vietminh army.

1945

Japanese take over French administration throughout
Indochina, March 9.
Bao Dai proclaims the independence of Vietnam under
Japanese auspices, March 11.
At Potsdam Conference in July, Allied leaders assign
British to disarm Japanese in southern Vietnam; Chinese
Nationalists to perform the same function north of the
sixteenth parallel.
Japanese transfer power in Indochina to the Vietminh,
August 18.
Bao Dai abdicates on August 23.
Ho proclaims provisional government in Hanoi on August 19,
with Bao Dai as supreme counselor.
Japan formally surrenders to the Allies. He declares the
independence of Vietnam, September 2.
British forces under General Douglas Gracey land in Saigon
on September 18; soon return authority to the French.
Lieutenant Colonel A. Peter Dewey of the OSS is killed in
Saigon, September 26, the first American to die in Vietnam.
Indochinese Communist party dissolved in November, replaced
by Association for Marxist Studies as Ho tries to broaden
his base.
Throughout the period, some two million Vietnamese die of
famine in the north.

1946

China agrees to withdraw forces from Vietnam, and France
concedes its extraterritorial rights in China.
French and Vietminh reach accord in March; France
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recognizes Vietnam as a "free state" within the French
Union. French troops authorized to return to the north to
replace the Chinese. A referendum to determine whether
Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina should be reunited.
Battle of Dienbienphu begins, March 13; French defeated at
Dienbienphu, May 7.
Eisenhower decides in April against American intervention
to help France in Indochina after Britain rejects his
proposal for concerted action.
Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference opens in May 3,
with Britain and Soviet Union as co-chairmen.
Bao Dai selects Ngo Dinh Diem as prime minister, June 16.
Pierre Mendes-France, invested as prime minister of France,
Jun 17, pledged to achieve a cease fire in Indochina within
a month; goes to Bern to negotiate secretly with Zhou
Enlai, Chinese foreign minister.
Diem returns to Saigon, July 7.
Agreements reached at Geneva in July call for cessation of
hostilities in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Provisional
demarcation line at seventeenth parallel divides Vietnam
pending political settlement to be achieved through
nationwide elections. Final declaration accepted orally by
all participants at the conference except United States,
which states it will not disturb the agreements but would
view renewed aggression with concern.
Bao Dai's government denounces agreements.
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed,
September 8, by United States, Britain, France, Australia,
New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and Philippines.
French forces leave Hanoi, October 9.
General J. Lawton Collins, Eisenhower's special envoy,
arrives in Saigon to affirm American support for Diem,
including $100 million in aid. Hundreds of thousands of
refugees flee from the north to the south with help of U.S.
Navy.
1955

United States begins to funnel aid directly to Saigon
government in January, agrees to train South Vietnamese
army.
Diem crushes the Binh Xuyen sect in April.
Period ends for French forces and their Vietnamese
auxiliaries to deploy to the south, and Vietminh troops to
regroup in the north.
Diem rejects the Geneva accords and refuses to participate
in nationwide elections on July 16, a decision backed by
the United States.
Ho Chi Minh, in Moscow in July, accepts aid, having earlier
negotiated in Beijing for Chinese assistance.
Diem defeats Bao Dai in a referendum, October 23, becomes
chief of state; proclaims the Republic of Vietnam, with
himself as president, October 26.
In December, land reform in North Vietnam reaches its most
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radical phase as landlords go before "people's tribunals."
1956

Prince Sihanouk, now Cambodian prime minister, asserts his
intention in April to pursue a neutralist policy.

1957

In January, Soviet Union favoring a permanent division of
the country, proposes that North and South Vietnam be
admitted to United Nations as separate states.
Diem arrives in U.S. for ten-day visit on May 8.
President
Eisenhower reaffirms support for his regime.
Communist insurgent activity in South Vietnam begins in
October in accordance with decision reached in Hanoi to
organize thirty-seven armed companies in Mekong delta.
During the year, guerrillas assassinated more than four
hundred minor South Vietnamese officials.

1958

Communists form a coordinated command structure in eastern
Mekong delta in June.
Prince Souvanna Phouma dissolves his neutralist government
in Laos on July 22;
succeeded by Phoui Sananikone, who
with American support adopts anti-Communist stance.

1959

A plot to overthrow Sihanouk uncovered in February, with a
CIA agent involved.
North Vietnam forms Group 559 in May, to begin infiltrating
cadres and weapons into South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh
Trail.
Major Dale Buis and Sergeant Chester Ovnand killed by
guerrillas at Bienhoa on July 8, the first Americans to die
in what would be called the Vietnam Era.
Diem promulgates law authorizing intense repression of
Communist suspects and other dissidents in August.
Hanoi leadership creates Group 959 in September to furnish
weapons and other supplies to Communist insurgents in Laos.

1960

North Vietnam imposes universal military conscription in
April.
Eighteen prominent South Vietnamese petition Diem to reform
his governments.
Captain Kong Le stages coup d'etat in Laos in August, hands
power back to Souvanna Phouma.
General Phouma Noasvan,
with CIA help, forms opposition faction in souther Laos.
Lao Dong congress opens in Hanoi, September 5;
stresses
need to combat Diem regime.

1965

Johnson's national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy,
arrives in Saigon on February 4, as Soviet Prime Minister
Aleksei Kosygin arrives in Hanoi.
Vietcong state attacks against American installations,
February 7.
Johnson authorizes Flaming Dart, American air raids against
North Vietnam.
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Dr. Phan Huy Quat forms governments in Saigon, February 18:
General Khanh leaves the country.
Operation Rolling Thunder sustained American bombing of
North Vietnam, begins on February 24.
Two marine battalions land to defend Danang airfield, March
8; the first American combat troops in Vietnam.
Johnson, at Johns Hopkins University, April 7, offers Ho
Chi Minh participation in a Southeast Asian development
plan in exchange for peace.
North Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Dong rejects
Johnson's proposal, April 8; says settlement must be based
on Vietcong program.
Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky takes over as prime minister
of a military regime in Saigon, June 11.
American command in Saigon reports on June 26 that Vietcong
have put five South Vietnamese combat regiments and nine
battalions out of action in recent months.
Johnson reappoints Lodge ambassador to South Vietnam, July
8, to replace Taylor. Eighteen American combat battalions
now in the country.
Johnson approves Westmoreland's request, July 28, for
forty-four additional combat battalions.
In September, Chinese Defense Minister Lin Biao, in "Long
Live the Victory of People's War," indicates China will not
intervene directly in Vietnam. Mao Zedong begins the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
American forces defeat North Vietnamese units in the
LaDrang valley in October, the first big conventional slash
of the war.
By December, American troop strength in Vietnam reaches
nearly 200,000.
Johnson suspends bombing of North Vietnam on December 25 in
an attempt to induce the Communists to negotiate.
1966

Johnson resumes bombing, January 31.
Johnson and South Vietnamese leaders issue a communique,
February 8, in Honolulu, emphasizing for pacification in
South Vietnam.
Buddhist demonstrators against Saigon regime in Hue and
Danang, March 10. Government troops take over Danang, May
23. Government troops take over Hue, June 16.
American aircraft bomb oil depots near Hanoi and Haiphong,
June 29.
President de Gaulle of France visits Cambodia in September;
calls for American withdrawal from Vietnam.
American and South Vietnamese leaders conclude conference
in Manila, October 25.
American troop strength in Vietnam reaches nearly 400,000
by year-end.

1967

North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh says on
January 28, United States must stop bombing North Vietnam
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before talks can begin.
Johnson ends two-day meeting on Guam, March 21, with Thieu
and Ky ..
North Vietnamese reveal exchange of letters between Johnson
and Ho Chi Minh.
Westmoreland confers with Johnson in Washington, April 27;
addresses Congress next day.
Ellsworth Bunker arrives in Saigon to replace Lodge as
ambassador, May 1.
1970

Kissinger begins secret talks in Paris with Le Due Tho,
February 20.
Sihanouk overthrown in Cambodia by Lon Nol and Sisowath
Sirik Matak, March 18.
Nixon announces, April 30, that American and South
Vietnamese forces have attacked Communists sanctuaries in
Cambodia.
Large antiwar protests spread across the United States.
National guardsmen kill four students at Kent State
University in Ohio on May 4.
Nixon proposes "standstill cease-fire," October 7, but
repeats mutual-withdrawal formula next day.
American combat deaths in Vietnam during last week in
October numbered twenty-four, lowest toll since October,
1965.
On November 12, Lieutenant William Calley goes on trial at
Fort Benning, Georgia, for his part in the Mylai massacre.
American troop strength in Vietnam down to 280,000 men at
year-end.

1971

In February, South Vietnamese forces begin incursions in
Laos against the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Lieutenant Calley convicted, March 29, of premeditated
murder of South Vietnamese civilians at Mylai.
Thieu reelected president of South Vietnam, October 3.
American troop strength in Vietnam down to 140,000 in
December.

1972

Nixon reveals on January 25 that Kissinger has been
negotiating secretly with the North Vietnamese.
North Vietnam launches offensive across the demilitarized
zone, March 30.
On April 15, Nixon authorizes bombing of area near Hanoi
and Haiphong.
North Vietnamese capture the city of Quangtri, May 1.
On May 8, Nixon announces mining of Haiphong harbor and
intensification of American bombing of North Vietnam.
Thieu opposes draft agreement in meeting with Kissinger's
assistant, Alexander Haigh, October 4.
Breakthrough at Paris meeting between Kissinger and Le Due
Tho, October 8. Back in Saigon in mid-October, Kissinger
finds Thieu implacably opposed to agreement.
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Hanoi radio broadcasts details of the agreement in an
effort to pressure Kissinger. But he is anxious to
reassure North Vietnam; declares that "peace is at hand."
Kissinger resumes talks with Le Due Tho, November 20,
presents him with sixty-nine amendments to agreement
demanded by Thieu.
Fresh talks between Kissinger and Le Due Tho begin again in
December and break down.
On December 18, Nixon orders bombing of areas around Hanoi
and Haiphong, raids continue to eleven days. Communists
agree to resume diplomatic talks when bombing stops.
1973

Kissinger and Le Due Tho resume talks, January 8, finally
initial agreement, January 23.
Cease fire agreements formally signed in Paris, January 27.
Secretary of Defense Laird announces that draft in the
United States has ended.
Last American troops leave Vietnam, March 29.
Last American prisoners of war released in Hanoi, April 1.

1974

Thieu declares in January that the war has begun again.
Communist buildup of men and supplies proceeds in South
Vietnam in June.

1975

Communists capture Phuoc Long province, north of Saigon,
January 6.
North Vietnamese General Van Tien Dung goes south to take
command of Communist forces, February 5.
Communist capture Banmethuot, March 11.
Thieu meets with his commanders at Camranh, March 15;
orders northern provinces of South Vietnam abandoned.
Thieu reserves himself, orders Hue held at all costs, March
20. But the city falls to the Communists five days later.
Communists capture Danang, March 30.
On March 31, politburo in Hanoi directs General Dung to
push toward Saigon in the "Ho Chi Minh Campaign."
Le Due Tho arrives at Communist headquarters at Locninh,
April 7, to oversee offensive.
In Cambodia, Phnompenh falls to the Khmer Rouge, April 17.
Communists capture Xuan Loe, April 21, last South
Vietnamese defense line before Saigon.
President Ford, speaking in New Orleans on April 23, calls
the war "finished."
Thieu leaves Saigon for Taiwan, April 25. Vice-President
Tran Van Huong transfers authority as chief of state to
General Duong Van Minh, April 28.
Option IV, evacuation of last Americans from Saigon, begins
April 29. Ambassador Martin departs.
Communist forces capture Saigon, April 30. Colonel Bui Tin
takes surrender from Minh.
U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez seized by Cambodian Communists
in Gulf of Siam, May 12. American aircraft bomb Cambodia.
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Thirty-eight U.S. marines die in rescue of thirty-nine
seamen.
1977

On January 21, the day after his inauguration, Carter
pardons most of 10,000 Vietnam war draft evaders.
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke begins talks
with Vietnamese officials in March to explore U.S.
recognition of Vietnam.

1978

Vietnam joins Comecon, the East European economic
community, in June.
In July, tensions between Vietnam and Cambodia build up;
relations between Vietnam and China deteriorate.
In October, United States postpones plans to normalize
relations with Vietnam.
In November, Vietnam and Soviet Union sign a friendship
pact, which the Chinese term a "threat to the security" of
southeast Asia.
Vietnam starts to repress its ethnic Chinese minority.
Thousands flee the country.
Vietnam invades Cambodia, December 25.
Thousands of "boat people" begin to flee Vietnam in
December.

1979

China invades Vietnam in February. 2

1982

Vietnam veterans memorial unveiled in Washington, D.C.,
November 11. 3

1986

Vietnam veterans march in Chicago, June 13. 4
Why such an emphasis on Tet?

The crucial decisiveness of these

unexpected battles, unexpected in Vietnam and by the public in the
United States led to a psychological defeat in the face of a genuine
military victory.

And there has been unending controversy ever since.
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CHAPTER III
HOW REPORTAGE SHAPED PERCEPTION
Indeed, they were the "Reporters of the Lost War."
Thomas R. Morgan told of their heroic efforts in an article for
the July, 1984 issue of the Esguire magazine.
did and their influence:

Morgan reported what they

"For most Americans, the war was media.

The

news we saw, heard and read in our living room defined it and gave it a
certain dimension. 111
Morgan interviewed ten well-known journalists who covered
Vietnam,

Interviewed were Ward Just, David Halberstam, Michael Herr,

Peter Arnett, Tim Page, Charles Mohr, John Laurence, Neil Sheehan,
Gloria Emerson and H. D. S. Greenway.

Morgan goes on to show the ten

are highly regarded, won awards and served in Vietnam ranging from at
least eleven months to more than ten years at various times in a space
of fifteen years or so.
Just's experiences were summarized in these words:
"What the war did," he said,
was really make me a profound pessimist. I have never seen a
collection of men work harder than the Americans in Vietnam. I'm
talking specifically about my time there. The war overwhelmed
everyone. In the American embassy, the twelve-to-fourteen-hour day
was absolutely routine. Love affairs took place in the context of
the war. Evenings of drinking took place in the context of the war.
You could go days, literally, without having a conversation that had
anything to do with anything other than the war. You were caught up
in that funny kind of way you are in the opening moments of a love
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affair.
And for many people, this had been going on for years--it
was their entire life.
And then add this:
"The thing that Vietnam did, of course," he said,
was spoil you for anything else.
It didn't seem to me that being a
political writer had the same stakes that the war did.
The war
really mattered, getting things right about the war mattered,
spending time with the troops and trying to find out truly what was
going on mattered in a way that dreaming up editorials didn't.
I
did not want to go cover another war, either.
I'd done that.
So I
was ruined as a journalist after Vietnam. There was too much that
could not be explained. After what you'd seen, the only way you
could write about it was to go very deep into the imagination and
write about it in a fictional mode.
I might add that Vietnam was
not a popular subject and writing about it is no way to fame, power,
and riches.
Any analysis of reporting of events immediately before, during,
and after Tet must first acknowledge what must first be present to make
news.
Stephens and Lanson in their text, Writin& & Reportin&, list
several generally accepted news determinants.

Included are:

impact,

controversy, weight, emotion, uniqueness, prominence, timeliness,
currency, educational value. 2
War is controversy.
news.

War certainly is conflict and therefore

Often, big and continuing news.

It is neither partisan or

simplistic to offer that all the news media play a substantial and
important role in affecting the American public as well as many of those
in the free world.
Patterson and McClure had this to say in The Unseein& Eye:
To control what people see and hear means to control the public's
view of political reality.
By covering certain news events, by
simply giving them space, the media signals the importance of these
events to the citizenry.
By not reporting other activities, the
media hides portion of reality from everyone but the few people
directly affected . . . . Events and problems placed on the national
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agenda by the media excite public interest and become objects of
government action. 3
This conclusion by Patterson and McClure implies a conspiracy by
news executives to "place" news before the public.
and did happen in the Tet coverage.

This does not happen

The enormous competition alone in

the news industry eliminates the often mentioned "conspiracy" theory.
The author disagrees, too, with the observation by Patterson and
McClure that "the media hides portions of reality from everyone but the
few people directly affected.

"

Professional journalists who seek

to "hide" news will not survive long in a highly competitive situation.
And the Tet offensive was a competitive event for reporters.
Tet had many correspondents.

It is likely that few were more

competent, or braver, than a reporter for the New York Times.
Charles Mohr.

He was

Mohr and two other journalists were awarded Bronze Stars

in 1980 by the then commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.
The three were the only civilians so honored by the marines for
heroism during the Vietnam War.

Their Bronze Stars were for attempting

under fire to rescue a dying marine.

Mohr was not wounded, but

correspondents Alvin Webb of UPI and David Greenway of Time were hit by
gunfire or shells.
Their uncommon bravery was documented in Battle for Hue by Keith
William Nolan. 4
Mohr offered his reflection on Hue, Tet and Vietnam in a far
ranging interview with aforementioned writer Morgan. 5
. And the Marine that Dave Greenway, Al Webb and I saved at Hue
had been shot in the throat and died anyway. That affected me most
profoundly in the intensity and degree of contempt built up in me
for civilian policy makers [who put] troops in hazard for concepts
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like credibility and essentiality, which boils down to the
unwillingness to admit a mistake and disengage.
Writer Morgan asked Mohr if Vietnam had bothered his sleep.
"I have never had nightmares because of Vietnam," he said.
It made me see what war is though.
Peter Arnett and some other
reporters and I were together one night during some fighting and we
were able to sleep in the medical bunker on the operating cots.
Well, four or five times during the night we had to get up as they
brought casualties in.
I remember one kid who had been in the
National Football League draft was brought in with his legs all
blown to hell and he wanted to hold my hand and all that stuff. 6
Mohr did some sober reflecting on what he and other journalists
did in Vietnam and presented the results in an article "Once Again--Did
the Press Lose Vietnam?"

A sub-headline read "A veteran correspondent

takes on the new revisionists."

The article is authoritative in that

Mohr spent four years as a battle correspondent in Vietnam from 1962
through 1973.

Mohr was in Saigon when the Tet offensive began as was

Peter Braestrup.
Mohr then was an on-the-scene observer at Tet who rebuts what he
describes as "the surly critiques of the polemicists."

And Mohr

identified some of those he claimed were guilty of historical
revisionism with this:
Notable among the critics, writing and speaking with varying degrees
of bitterness and coherence, have been the editorial page of The
Wall Street Journal, Robert S. Elegant, (a former Los Angeles Times
reporter), William F. Buckley, John P. Roche, Walt W. Rostow,
William C. Westmoreland, Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger. 7
Mohr contends, simply and directly, that the revisionists, and
he has named only a few, simply do not know much about what it is that
they are talking and writing about.
Some of these critics have drawn conclusions that bear little
relation to the actual conduct of mainstream journalists for major
news organizations in the years 1961 to 1975.
Some of their
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conclusions also reflect an astonishing misrepresentation, or at
least misunderstanding of the nature of war.
This can be especially
disturbing when it comes from former civilian officials who helped
manage and prosecute the war.
There is also confusion about the
manner in which events actually unfolded, the problems of Vietnam
war correspondence, and what the journalists actually said and
wrote. 8
Mohr's attack against the revisionists must be understood in the
context and against the backdrop of very frequent criticism of Vietnam
war correspondents.
It was common knowledge among journalists here in the United
States during the early 1960s that President John F. Kennedy was quite
unhappy over the Vietnam coverage and sought to have David Halberstam of
the New York Times returned home.
There was continuing tension over the independent reporting by
professional journalists in Vietnam.
withdrawal from Saigon.

And it continued until the U.S.

The assault on the journalists by revisionists

has not ceased, either, since Mohr's 1984 article.
of course, by journalists.

Mistakes were made,

Mohr has this summary of the overall

performance by journalists and their shaping of perceptions.
Before and after Tet, the story did often tend to overwhelm the
essentially conventional journalistic methods we employed. Much
went unreported, although this may have been unavoidable in a
sprawling nation of forty-four provinces and scores of allied
divisions and brigades.
Granted that much went unreported, that factual errors were not
rare, that sometimes were too argumentative and skeptical (although
much of the time we were far too gullible), that we spent too much
time covering American troops and too little with the South
Vietnamese.
Still, in a broad sense, the coverage seems sound in
retrospect.
Not only ultimately, but also at each major milestone
of the war, the weight of serious reporting corresponds quite
closely to the historical record.
Revisionists seem to fault correspondents for distrusting the
version of events propounded by the most optimistic senior officials
in Vietnam. But what if the correspondents had believed the version

25
and been guided by it in carrying out their assignment? In that
case, the reporters' reputations, which are not unblemished, would
be irredeemably tarnished. 9
The reputations of Mohr and other Vietnam correspondents have
not, to my knowledge, been "irredeemably tarnished" by the revisionists
or anyone else.

There is rather an almost universal failing abroad in

this land to either understand, or struggle to understand, what it is
journalists do or why they do it.
Two colleagues of Charles Mohr--David Halberstam, then of the
New York Times and Malcolm Browne of the Associated Press--were awarded
the Pulitzer Prize in 1964.
Halberstam, a graduate of Harvard College, was no favorite of
his fellow Harvard alumnus--John F. Kennedy--due to his honest accurate
and hard-hitting reporting.

And he pulled no punches in telling Morgan

later of what it meant to be an honest reporter in Vietnam.
The truth, and it remains for me all these years still a painful
truth, is that we in the media erred not in being too pessimistic,
but in not being pessimistic enough . . . . We never managed to get
into our stories what the French Indochina war had done to Vietnam,
how it had created in the North a modern dynamic society and how it
had given us as allies a dying postfeudal order . . . . [Our sins
were] not that we were inadequately patriotic or that we undermined
an otherwise high national purpose--but rather that we did not from
the start make clear the impossibility of the struggle.
That is
burden enough for most of us to bear these twenty years. 10
Without question, Halberstam ranks very high in any rating of
hero correspondents in Vietnam.
first.

And he was among the first, if not the

His cohorts included Homer Bigart of the New York Times, and

Mert Perry who were not interviewed by Morgan.
Halberstam was a recent Harvard graduate.

That assured at least

a modicum of competence and talent.
Halberstam, later the author of several books, once correctly
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wrote:

"Vietnam was a war in which journalists made their reputations

and generals lost theirs."

So it was.

And those generals and other

military officials still have not forgiven journalists.
In fifteen months of superb reporting, Halberstam established a
permanent reputation as a first class reporter and writer.
Any consideration of Halberstam must include an appraisal of the
work of combat correspondent Homer Bigart.

Nieman Fellow Jack Foisie

'47 this remembrance of Bigart for the Fall, 1991 issue of the Nieman
Reports: 11
He was the longest-serving copy boy ever to put in time on The
New York Herald Tribune.
His editors were slow to learn that behind
his intense stuttering was a stubborn talent.
As a Stars and Stripes reporter I remember taking Homer out in
Sicily on his first look at ground combat. Until then he had been
based in London, one of the first correspondents to fly bombing
missions.
I took him to the Third Division HQ where he was briefed, then
to regiment, then to battalion.
"That's about it, Mr. Bigart," I
said.
"We can go up to an OP and you can see some fighting. " But
oh no, the newcomer insisted on going forward to a company. Then he
made a bent-over dash to a platoon outpost. Where he and his
reluctant guide took a bout of German mortar fire.
This guy isn't
going to last long, I decided.
His cabled report to the Herald-Trib that day skipped any
personalization.
But the home front readers gained a good idea of
what combat is all about.
The rest is legion. When The Herald Tribune folded, The New
York Times grabbed him.
It took me some time before I realized Homer also had acting
talent. When the press camp was about to move, Homer always seemed
bewildered.
I or other colleagues always found ourselves doing his
packing, rolling up his sleeping bag. While Homer pecked out
another dispatch!
It was the same ambling Bigart in Korea.
Our paths did not
cross there. But they did again in the early days in Vietnam. What
a remarkable man. Although they will be Nieman citations, perhaps
your idea of recognizing journalistic excellence could be called
Bigart Awards.
The Bigart reputation than cast a heavy shadow of independence
and integrity upon the younger Halberstam and others.

And Halberstam,

27

although only twenty-eight, responded brilliantly to the challenge in
his Vietnam assignment.

And praise came quickly.

He earned a Pulitzer

Prize and several other awards.
Commentarv magazine described Halberstam as the "Times most
exceptional reporter of recent years."
of 35 .

Harper's said: " . . . at the age

a legend in American journalism.
Tom Morgan accurately focus on Halberstam as the "Woodward and

Bernstein of Vietnam."

It is even fairer to say that Woodward and

Bernstein are the David Halberstam of Vietnam.
He is still the first correspondent I think of when I remember
Vietnam's adversarial journalism . . . . He blew the whistle the
loudest, if not quite first or more clearly, following his idol,
Homer Bigart, who had left prophesizing that the war wasn't to be
won. After he left it took several years before other
correspondents concluded that the war wouldn't be won, and several
years more before any felt, that, under the circumstance, it
shouldn't be won. 12
The late, great Ernie Pyle, of course, had no direct and
specific influence on the Vietnam War.

His shadow of heroism and

professionalism did hover over Bigart, Foisie, Halberstam and many
others.
Controversy has swirled about reporter Halberstam and his role
in the war.

Controversy over Vietnam has dogged Halberstam and will

continue to do so.

It is clear, however, that the professionalism and

courage of Halberstam did make a difference.

History will only polish

those Halberstam qualities, not diminish them.
Unlike their friend Mohr, neither Halberstam or the estimable
Neil Sheehan covered Tet.

But Sheehan since his Vietnam days in the

early 1960s has emerged as one of this century's premier American
journalists.
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Writer Torn Morgan in his aforementioned Esquire piece wrote of
Sheehan:
Inspired by his friend (Horner) Bigart, Sheehan along with Halberstam
and Browne helped discover his own country's awesome "credibility
gap" in Vietnam. In turn, that discovery brought him to another:
that he would have to make his choice--not only as a journalist but
also as an Arnerican--between politics and truth. Vietnam insisted
that Sheehan define himself as a public man and as a private
citizen. 13
Sheehan, a Harvard College graduate as Halberstam, first went to
Vietnam for the United Press International and was later hired by the
New York Times.

Some of what Sheehan, a U.S. Army veteran before

Vietnam, told writer Morgan is of considerable significance in light of
later developments.

His words are most meaningful, in my opinion, in

seeking to evaluate, understand and assess and evaluate how reporters
shape perception.
In part Sheehan commented:
I went there as a young man with all the ideas of the Cold War and
American imperialism in my head, believing in all that. I was very
much in favor of our being in Vietnam. I think we all were in 1962
and 1963. And we ran into a situation where no official spokesman
on the American side would tell you anything. It was a splendid
mistake the Kennedy administration made. They thought they would
reduce reporting in Vietnam if the official spokesman provided no
information. Instead, they forced all of us to develop a whole
network of sources among the South Vietnamese military and the
American advisers, sources of our own. We had to get the
information ourselves. Nobody was going to give it to us. It
wasn't going to be announced. And this gave us--at first it was
terribly difficult--enormous independence, because we were not
dependent upon the press spokesman. 14
Sheehan did not hold back in telling writer Morgan in detail
what he did and why he did it.

He and most of his colleagues reported

the pessimistic as well as the official of events.
American victory, but not at the cost of the truth.
to tell it like it was.

They wanted an
They always sought

29
This was not always easily accepted.

A very testy Secretary of

State Dean Rusk once asked correspondents:
"Whose side are you on?"
Rusk did not get Sheehan's answers directly, but Morgan did:
We felt we ought to try to convey the truth so that we could start
winning the war.
We felt that the senior officers who didn't have a
grasp of reality were in effect assisting the opposition, assisting
the Vietnamese Communists, because they were carrying out a selfdefeating policy, and, as Americans, we wanted to see the United
States win there.
We felt we were being patriotic. But then, as
the years went by, this slowly changed from an emotional desire to
help win the war to simply a struggle to get out the truth. 15
Sheehan spent from 1962 to 1966 covering the war for the UPI and
then the New York Times.
"What those Vietnam years did for me," Sheehan told Morgan,
was to confirm that I was professional witness, that my value lay in
what I could report of a situation looking at it independently, and
trying to find out and record and report what actually happened
versus what we would like to happen, or what people with vested
interests said had happened.
Vietnam made me grow up as a
16
journalist.
Sheehan took that maturity from Vietnam here to the United
States for a series of assignments from the New York Times from 1966 to
1971.

He first was at the Pentagon, then covered the White House and

then served as an investigative reporter for the Times' Washington
bureau.
A friend named Daniel Ellsberg read a Sheehan piece in which he
asked whether war crimes had actually been committed in Vietnam by
American leaders.
Although it became public later, Ellsberg made available a 47volume very secret report that eventually became known as the Pentagon
Papers.

Of course, it set off a wild battle between the Times and the
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U.S. government and involved the issue of a battle over prior straint
that had to be settled in a special session by the United States Supreme
Court.

The Times won and most of their stories about the Pentagon

Papers were written by Sheehan.
In recent years Sheehan has written a biography of the late Lt.
Col. John Paul Vann, who was both a hero and victim of the Vietnam war.
Vann was in Vietnam for nearly ten years as both a career soldier and as
a civilian official.
crash in Vietnam.

He was killed in early June, 1972 in a helicopter

Of his Vann book, published sometime in late 1988,

Sheehan told Morgan:
I felt I wanted to leave something behind more permanent than
another magazine article. So I thought I'd try to bring to history
and biography the qualities of the journalist: the ability to
reconstruct in detail something that has happened. 17
Four chapters of the Vann book were published in The New Yorker
during the summer of 1988.

Sheehan set about in the 1980s in Washington

to do what he said he had done in the 1960s:
interest."

"Serve the general

"In Vietnam," Sheehan told Morgan,

you served the general interest by providing information that helped
society to work its way through what turned out to be a long,
profound national crisis, which changed much of our thinking about
our role in the world, our fallibility versus our infallibility, our
right to kill in the name of American ideas. That is, we went into
Vietnam with the belief that we had the right to kill any Vietnamese
or get them killed, or any Korean, or any Chinese, because what we
were doing was going to save humanity. Well, then Vietnam made me,
at least, realize that we didn't have a monopoly on good. We could
do evil just like other people. If I succeed in writing a book that
helps us understand that experience better than we have so far, well
that would be a great emotional fulfillment for me. It would give
meaning to my life. 18
Any consideration of reporting (and reporters) must consider the
beginning of the Tet offensive in downtown Saigon.
of The New York Times was at center-point.

Again, Charles Mohr

Also, much present was Peter

31
Braestrup, then the chief of the Washin~ton Post's Saigon bureau. Mohr
was quick in his article published in the Columbia Journalism Review to
defend the reporting of the Communist invasion of the U.S. Embassy
grounds.
The most serious charge made by the revisionists, and one of the
most frequently repeated, is that the Vietnam press corps failed to
report an allied victory at Tet and, indeed, concealed its
existence.
There were unquestionably, flaws in the purely military
coverage and not all of them were sins of omission.
But in its raw
form the charge does not seem to hold up. 19
Mohr was steadfast in his opposition to the revisionists with
this:
I believe that Tet represented a serious tactical defeat for the
Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese superiors.
But this did not
ultimately constitute a strategic victory for South Vietnam.
That
should be obvious.
It was also argued that Tet shattered, nearly
destroyed, the indigenous guerrillas and forced North Vietnam to
continue the war with its own regular army troops.
This was also to
a large extent true; but it was also what almost all serious
20
journalists reported.
Gloria Emerson is certainly not to be overlooked;~ any study of
Vietnam correspondents.
Emerson's philosophy was apparent in this comment to Morgan:
"I didn't have any idea what the war would mean to me.

All I ever

wanted to do in my whole life was work for the New York Times.
the kingdom.

It was

I never wanted to do anything else. 1121

And there was this comment to Morgan about Vietnam and World War
II reporting:
In Vietnam, the reporters were on the wrong side. That created a
certain mental strain, a peculiar anguish that could not have been
known by correspondents in World War II. And then, to come back
home and find no one held accountable for the ruin of a small
country and see our veterans was to know a despair that was
inconceivable as a younger woman.
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Emerson was asked by Morgan what her lasting impressions of
Vietnam

were.

The answer:

. I have become someone else. Certainly harsher, certainly
crueler. I find that instead of being more gentle and more
sympathetic, I am harsher and I am crueler. That's--well, you
wanted to know what effect the war had. But maybe I would have been
this way anyway.
The last interview for Tom Morgan was with H. D. S. (David)
Greenway.

Here was the proper Bostonian with a Yale, Oxford and U.S.

Navy background who spent the better part of the years 1967 to 1975 in
Indochina.

He also spent time at Harvard as a Nieman Fellow.

And

became an associate editor at the Boston Globe.
Greenway stands tall as one of America's premier correspondents
in the Vietnam war.

Greenway was wounded at Hue when he and Charlie

Mohr and Alvin Webb, UPI, risked their lives to rescue a severely
wounded Marine.

Greenway was wounded in the leg and returned to duty

the next week and on crutches was sending his dispatches from Saigon.
Greenway told Tom Morgan:
I covered Vietnam for Time from Saigon in 1967 and 1968, and then
from Bangkok, running the bureau that had responsibility for Laos
and Cambodia. I was in Laos in March of 1970 for the coup against
Sihanouk, and in the spring of 1972 for the North Vietnamese
invasion. I then joined the Washin&ton Post and they sent me right
back to Saigon. I kept going back and back. I was there in 1973,
the time of "peace at hand" the peace that never really was a peace,
then months after that in Cambodia with the war getting worse and
worse. In the spring of 1975 I went from Cambodia back to Vietnam
for the collapse of Saigon, and then I finally left by helicopter
from a rooftop in the command of the American embassy on April 29,
1975. 22
And there was this quote from Greenway to Morgan:
There wasn't any need for me to rush back and back, except for the
terrible attraction that Indonesia had, and except there wasn't any
place as interesting. And even today, nothing life has ever reached
that intensity. If I'm lucky, it never will again.
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In 1980, Greenway, Mohr and the UPI's Webb all were awarded
Bronze Stars by the commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.

They were the

only civilians so honored by the Marines during the Vietnam War.

Nolan

in "Battle for Hue" graphically details the heroics of the three
newsmen.

It should be remembered they were noncombatants, civilians,

who risked their lives to rescue a dying fellow American--a young U.S.
Marine.

Tragically, the Marine dies later despite their efforts.
Photographer Tim Page found early that combat was not safe for

photographers.

Robert Capa died.

Burrows and Sean Flynn perished.

And later Page's buddies Larry
But Page survived.

Page was grievously wounded by a land mine, but managed to
survive.
Tom Morgan asked what had been driving Page in Vietnam.

The

answer:
You are either curious and intrigued about what's happening in a
place or not. You've got to keep playing with finding out, or not.
If you want to do that, Vietnam was sure as hell exciting.
It was a
rock 'n' roll time.
I had some of the best cope, the best women I
ever had.
It was karma.
The Sixties, mate were the most important
decade, sex and drugs and rock 'n' roll. And 1968, that was the
most important year of all.
The Doors, the Airplane--you have to
remember the music.
I loved it.
It was the fastest, most exciting
time I'll ever see.
I don't regret a minute of it, although it
would have been nice to have had a little less pain. 23
Charles Mohr is now dead.

His spirit, however, should be alive

for a long time in writers covering wars--anywhere and any place.
came out of Nebraska and graduated from the state university there.

Mohr
His

career as a war correspondent spanned more than thirty years.
Professional journalists generally agreed that covering wars and related
military affairs brings out the best of journalistic talents.
Mohr was all of that for Time and the New York Times.

Indeed,

He was eclectic.

34
He served as a competent White House correspondent, covered political
campaigns nationwide, and wrote well on a variety of military technology
subjects.
The place of Michael Herr in Vietnam War history is secure for
now and forever.

The author of Dispatches will be always remembered for

his audacious reporting and observations.
He once said,
I went there behind the crude but serious belief that you had to be
able to look at anything, serious because I acted on it and went,
crude because I didn't know, it took the war to teach it, that you
were as responsible for everything you saw as you were for
everything you did. 24
Herr covering future wars?
"Any more wars?
Vietnam is the
up the obsession.
every time there's
a magazine to go.
to, man.

Never again, man," he says. 25
central issue of my generation. We never cleaned
But I'll never go to another war.
Shit, man,
a shot fired around the world, I get a call from
I won't want to see it ever again.
I don't want

Herr's reactions should answer those who would dramatize death
in battle as something greatly heroic and to be desired.

Herr's remarks

reminds one of the actions by General Lucien K. Truscott, the crusty
World War II combat leader who returned to the Anzio beachhead on
Memorial Day, 1945.

Truscott was one of several speakers, but he spoke

to the dead, not the living.
Truscott emotionally faced the lines of crosses and Stars of
David.

He apologized to his fallen comrades and warned that old men

should remember there was nothing dramatic or to be desired about death
in combat.

Among the witnesses at that dramatic scene was Bill Mauldin,

Truscott's friend and a Pulitzer Prize winning cartoonist.
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Peter Arnett is another esteemed correspondent who witnessed,
and survived, the Vietnam conflict.

Arnett's considerable skills have

since earned his recognition for his work for CNN during the Gulf War.
Arnett's peers, according to Tom Morgan, argue that Arnett
should have received more than a Pulitzer Prize.

Arnett was then

praised by his peers for "accurate observation, unflagging curiosity,
and competitive zeal."
Those same peers also declared that Arnett's personal research
and military savvy developed to heroic proportions during Vietnam
combat.

Younger reporters were told to risk their lives for a story

overnight in a Vietnam village "only if Arnett is there."
John Laurence of CBS News was a good friend and colleague of
Charles Mohr.

Laurence was a college dropout who went from the U.S. to

Vietnam for the first time in 1965 and spent many years there.
He told Morgan in most poignant terms what the war meant to him:
The Vietnam experience--to see all that waste of life--was
deeply disturbing. Very, very few journalists or soldiers who saw
combat were not affected by it. War is a shattering, abhorrent form
of human behavior, brutal beyond imagination. It was a long war,
and if it changed me it is that having been rational and fairly
level-headed, having practiced my profession in a good way, and
behaved humanely through it, all that has given me a certain
confidence in dealing with ordinary life and ordinary situations.
"War," he continued,
teaches you a lot about other people and about yourself. These very
violent situations, shared with other men and women who do or do not
react gracefully, tend to create an extraordinary history for a
friendship. Many of my closest friends today are reporters and
photographers I went through the war with. We had a shared spirit
of excitement in combat. That cannot be denied. The British said
we were war junkies and war lovers and had a death wish. But I feel
we were just the opposite. Meticulous planning, careful briefing,
and caution kept us alive. One was not a war-lover. The war wasn't
"fun. " 26

36
The following basic questions were asked of ten journalists
interviewed for this-dissertation:
1.

Was the news coverage of the Tet military action reliable enough
to be used by future teachers, students, and historians? If
not, why not?

2.

Was there accurate coverage during Tet of President Johnson and
his administration in Washington, D.C. and in Vietnam? If not,
why not?

3.

What mistakes were made during Tet by the news media in Vietnam
and Washington?

4.

Was Peter Braestrup accurate in his accusations of President
Johnson's alleged "willy nilly" conduct before and during Tet?

5.

Are the available radio, TV tapes and news accounts, periodicals
and books on Tet accurate enough for use today by students,
teachers and scholars? If not, why not?
Those interviewed all were reporters or observers in Vietnam.

Their answers to the attached key questions were offered without bias
and the spirit of neutrality.
First interviewed was Larry Green, then Midwest bureau chief of
the Los An&eles Times.

He was assigned to Vietnam as a correspondent

for the old Chicago Daily News in the 1960s and 1970s.

Interviewed June

22, 1986.
His answers:
1.

The coverage was reliable as any information that is quickly
gathered. We were doing history in a hurry. After the
fact, you can fill in the blanks and make adjustments.
There was simultaneous turmoil in every major battle and
development.

2.

No. That administration (Johnson] was not leveling with us.
The news from reporters was a lot more accurate. What was
written and reported was the kind of stuff that the first
Amendment was created for.
The press was way ahead in
telling the truth and perceiving what happened.
The new
media was sharper.

3.

Some coverage suggested that the Communist offensive as
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being more successful than it actually was.
Communists were
losing the battle, but laying the groundwork to win the war.
The events we were covering were happening in multiple
confusion and under very primitive circumstances. There
were more battles going on over there than journalists could
cover. And the military were not informing us.
4.

Am not able to answer.

5.

The news media is the best we've got. Reporters and
photographers did tend to stick together as we did at the
Embassy during Tet.

Jack Fuller now is editor of the Chica&o Tribune.
Pulitzer Prize for his editorials on the Constitution.

He earned a

Jack is a

graduate of Yale Law School and was reported for the old Chica&o Daily
News.

He has written a novel from his Vietnam experience.

Interviewed

July 20, 1986.
His answers:
I

1.

One has to be very careful to rely on the Tet coverage.
There were any number of misstatements.
I don't believe
that everything we have now is absolutely correct. At the
same time, it can be said there were some accounts that were
absolutely accurate.
I will cite the work of Bernard
Weintraub of the New York Times and Charles Mohr, now also
with the Times.

2.

I don't have enough information to think to answer this
question.

3.

The primary mistake was that we did not report Tet as a
tactical disaster for the North Vietnam. We didn't realize
the infrastructure was destroyed in the villages. The
misimpression at the time was that Tet was a strategic
victory for the enemy.

4.

There were problems before and after Tet as far as the
administration was concerned. The government was unwilling
to level with the people.

5.

They are accurate for use today if you are skeptical.

Keyes Beach accurately can be described as an "old hand" in the
Far East.

He logged nearly forty years out there as a U.S. Marine and a
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very successful correspondent for the old Chica~o Daily News.
observed World War II, Korea and Vietnam.

He

He is generally rated as one

of the premier war correspondents (U.S.) of this century.

He was

interviewed July 7, 1986, by telephone at his retirement home near
Washington, D.C.

Keyes Beech has since died.

1.

No.
It's not sensationalism. There were some instances of
sensational coverage.
It depends on why you read.
Breaking
into our Embassy was done. The enemy politically won Tet,
but not militarily.

2.

I'm not competent to answer.

3.

South Vietnamese committed atrocities.
However, we did not
photograph or play the atrocities committed by our enemies.
They were seldom reported. What the enemy did as far as
atrocities was hardly news. Yes, My Lai was terrible, but
what the North Vietnamese did at Hue was kill 3,000 persons.
Executed.
I've been around a lot of wars, but those
executions got little play.

4.

Yes.
I have faith in Peter Braestrup's credibility. And he
was a company commander with the U.S. Marines in Korea.

5.

I was very much impressed by the 13-part PBS series on
Vietnam.
I give Stanley Karnow a lot of credit for that
series. Really, I've stayed from a lot of the other
accounts and stories since I've returned.

Haynes Johnson, now a Washin~ton Post columnist, is a regular
and popular panelist on the PBS "Washington Review" TV show on Friday
nights.

He is the author of about ten boo~s.

Washington scene for many years.

He has been close to the

His father was a newsman.

He was

interviewed by telephone on July 7, 1986.
1.

News of any event is really not definitive.
why.

We do not know

2.

No. There were lots of reasons. There sometimes was not
credence to our second-guessing. We were not plugging into
reality. There was a lot of covering that we did not do.

3.

There were multiple mistakes. And there were many
misunderstandings. There was a misunderstanding of the
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roots of historical forces at work.
There was an awful lot
of "Bang-Bang" journalism also involved.
4.

Essentially yes.
case at times.

Peter Braestrup might have made too hard a

5.

I think you have to be careful in using and defining
accurate. What we have available, of course, are valuable
tools. All sides are useful to be seen. History then is
not black and white.

David Reed was a senior roving editor of the Reader's Di~est
magazine.

He was interviewed by telephone July 11, 1986 from his home

in Annapolis, MD.

Reed had several tours in Vietnam and wrote a book

and several articles on his experiences.

He tended to be caustic and

direct in any conversation, particularly one involving his profession
and colleagues.

4.

He is now dead.

1.

It was a military disaster, but political victory. You have
to remember that the American public despite the
developments really want out. TV infrastructure was left
intact despite the battles.

2.

The correspondents largely were inexperienced. They
embarrassed the government.
I am especially remembering
David Halberstam and Merton Perry. Mal Brown of the AP was
experienced and did a good job. There were some accurate
accounts and some were not.

3.

The mistake I remember now is that journalists failed to
realize there was a military disaster over there.

I have a graduated response.
There was some managing of the
news there.
I did not feel then, and do not now, that we were
brainwashed.
5.

The TV clips can be of some use.
But you often have tanks
going round and round for a minute and that's it.
I think
TV is out to sensationalize and in doing so makes the print
guys look bad. A lot of the people over there as
journalists were only 22-23 years old and did not have much
status. The photographers often shot and sent back whatever
they had.
I was there for a monthly magazine, so my
operating standards differed greatly from many others.

Bill Plante is now a correspondent for "CBS TV News".

He had
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four separate tours of duty in Vietnam from 1964 to 1975.
key, direct and concise.
of Chicago.

He is low-

Bill is a 1959 graduate of Loyola University

He was interviewed July 11, 1986.

1.

Yes.
It was what we knew at the time. We were limited by
the amount of time that was available to us. The military
action was a surprise and created temporary chaos.

2.

My impression is that we were given a heavy dose of selfserving bull-shit by Johnson and his people. We were
ambushed at Credibility Gap.

3.

We had little documentation for what the North Vietnamese
did.
I guess we saw their faults far less than we should
have.

4.

President Johnson did unpredictable things. He got away
with arm-twisting on the national level, but it would not
work on the international level. And he did not like this.

5.

I have not found much to fault.
say much more on this question.

I don't feel qualified to

Raymond R. Coffey is now a columnist and editorial page editor
of the Chica&o Sun Times.
University.

He is a graduate in journalism from Marquette

He served three tours in Vietnam as a correspondent for the

Chica&o Daily News.

He also served many years as the chief Washington

correspondent for the Chica&o Tribune.

He was interviewed July 14,

1986.
1.

I think so. The stuff that came out definitely should be
historically useful.

2.

Yes in Vietnam. Westmoreland was given a fair shake. The
psychological victory was important over the military
victory.
It was Westmoreland and Johnson who said this was
not a great victory for the VC.

3.

There were mechanical mistakes that are made on any big,
breaking story--even the Our Lady of Angels School fire.
There are initial judgments that later prove wrong. The
wire services make mistakes under pressure.
It is
unrealistic to not expect mistakes in the first four to
twelve hours. You are going to have them.
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4.

Johnson and Westmoreland were the principal contributors to
the "win" psychology. These two also blew us smoke over the
"light at- the end of the tunnel" stuff. The original shock
of Tet came out of what Johnson had been saying.

5.

Of TV coverage, I'll say they were competing among
themselves. You could use 6-i crews in the field fighting
for the best footage.
This sometimes made things go slow.

Hedrick Smith is now one of America's most celebrated
journalists.
him

His books on Russia and frequent TV appearances have made

very familiar to many Americans.

Interviewed in late October, 1986

by telephone in Washington, D.C.
1.

Yes. Officials spoke and reporters reported.
is a very valid part of history.

The evidence

2.

Yes. LBJ and the journalists were on the leading edge of
history.

3.

I doubt if there were inaccurate stories.
knowingly inaccurate.

4.

No comment.

5.

Generally, yes.

Stories were not

Lawrence Lichty, a Northwestern University professor and
nationally known expert on the Vietnam War's TV coverage.

He was

interviewed by telephone September 16, 1986.
1.

Yes.
Errors did creep into some satellite coverage, but it
was quickly corrected.

2.

Yes, even though Johnson manipulated the media, and lied to
reporters.

3.

Yes.
The media did not focus enough on the fact that the
war had come to the cities. There was drama during Tet, but
in some instances there was newspaper exaggeration.

4.

Johnson tried to get others to do his "dirty work" for him.
And it did not have much effect. He often overstated his
case.
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5.

Overall, some were accurate and some were not. Yes, the
reportage then can be used today.
It can be trusted.
In
some cases there is not enough for the larger perspective.

George Esper of the Associated Press is generally regarded as
one of the most highly regarded journalists to have come out of the
Vietnam War.

He was interviewed in Boston by telephone on September 8,

1986.
1.

The news coverage overall was very good.
The Tet coverage
certainly was on the mark.
Of course, Tet was the watershed
of the war. We did not completely report the crushing
defeat of the Viet Cong.
However, forty years from now the
eyewitness accounts of the enemy attacks on the U.S. Embassy
will be available for one and all to read.

2.

There was accurate adequate coverage in Vietnam. There
definitely was adequate coverage of the U.S. Embassy even
when there was conflict over battle accounts.
Everything
issued by the government was cleared with Washington. There
was no challenge of the AP on accuracy of our stories--to my
knowledge.

3.

Mistakes made? One stands out was we did not dig out the My
Lai story.
It only came out because of Seymour Hersh.

4.

Johnson did not give out accurate body counts of the Viet
Cong dead.

5.

Generally, everything read or watched today would be
accurate.
Sure, there were some minor mistakes. The AP
accounts absolutely can be relied upon.
It is amazing to me
now how accurate we were. We were accurate because we
usually had trained and experienced people at the scene.
I
think now we provided a wealth of material. Of course,
official documents would have to be examined today by
students, teachers, and scholars to supplement our
reportage.

Was the news reportage from Vietnam honest and fair?
It was overall with a few exceptions should be the only answer.
There might be some triteness to this, but it is accurate:
best and the brightest of American journalism served in Vietnam.
they were courageous, too.

The
And
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The censorship of news was extremely limited.
lied to?

Were reporters

Absolutely, especially by President Johnson and some of his

top aides.
Perhaps, James Reston summed it up best in his book Deadline
when writing:
When the United States did begin to intervene [in Vietnam] in
1961 and soon ran into trouble, Washington's reaction to the
depressing military news was to blame the reporters. On October 22,
1963 at a meeting in the White House, Kennedy suggested to Arthur
Ochs Sulzberger and Turner Catledge that David Halberstam, one of
our men in Saigon be transferred.
"Don't you think that he's too
close to the story?" Kennedy asked.
But Sulzberger said he had no
intention of transferring Halberstam, and Kennedy's intervention
merely assured that David and his colleagues would continue to have
the support of their publisher.
Halberstam's stormy talent was that he was not only "close to
the story" but on top of it.
This is why he had also usually been
ahead of the competition in his coverage of the civil rights
struggles in the South and in his reporting from the Congo.
It was
precisely because he and his colleague Neil Sheehan cared so deeply
and personally about the excesses and deceptions of the war that Lt.
Col. John Paul Vann, who was exposing the lies of the official
cornrnunigues, leaked the ugly facts to them for publication in the
Times. 27
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF MEDIA COVERAGE
FOR CLASSROOM USE;

FORMAL EDUCATION

Howard Elterman took the position in the January, 1988 Social
Education that students should consider public participation in decision
making! 1

Students should consider the press coverage by asking four

questions:
1.

What key policies did the United States carry out in this
theatre.

2.

What did government officials at the time tell the American
people about these policies.

3.

How accurately did The New York Times, Time, Newsweek, and U.S.
News and World Report, report on these issues nationally, for
example.

4.

How accurately did the alternative media, New Republic, New
Statesman, and the Guardian report on these matters. 2
The last two questions get to the very heart of the democratic

process in which the press performs the functions of keeping the public
informed and serving as a protection against government abuses.
Elterman also writes that coverage of the War, including Tet,
was blasted by both the political left and right here in the U.S.

The

coverage was described as negative, sensational and subversive of the
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overall struggle to defeat the communists.
According to these key sources and analyses the Doves' said the
journalists uncritically passed on government propaganda and failed to
represent fairly the views of war opponents.
The media definitely has admitted there was a flawed performance
but blamed it on struggling to cover a war on the other side of the
world and constant lying by government officials, the military, and
South Vietnamese forces, and censorship of field reports by editors and
publishers. 3
Students and their professors seeking answers to the above must
examine and reflect critically upon the problems of news reporting.
There are always factors that influence accuracy and completeness.
How well did the news media perform in influencing public
opinion and government conduct?

What, if anything, can be done to

improve news coverage?
One must agree with Elterman that there is comparatively
widespread ignorance among both young people and adults about the
Vietnam war.

And conditions possibly have worsened since an ABC News--

Washin~ton Post poll was taken in 1985 that found that one-third of the
adults polled did not know which side the U.S. supported in the war.
As shocking, 75 percent of the adults interviewed in the same
poll said they did not have a "clear idea" of what the war was about. 4
Ronald J. Nurse and Dan B. Fleming said there are seven focus
issues that the nation is struggling with.

They are:

(1) To what

extent can the U.S. have both "guns and butter" in our time?
support everyone who calls on us in the name of liberty?

(2) Can we

(3) Can a
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postindustrial democracy sustain a prolonged limited war?
there be limitations on wartime dissent in a democracy?
declared?

(4) Should
(5) Need war be

(6) What is the proper balance between the government's

desire to manage information and the public's right to know?

(7) How

has the nuclear "balance of terror" affected th~ role and the status of
the superpowers in international conflicts? 5
Nurse and Fleming write that textbooks on the Vietnam war give
little attention to the impact of the media.

This is most unfortunate.

One question well could be examined by students:

Do daily

scenes of war on television heighten awareness of the grimness of a war?
Or do they make people callous and lead them to tune out the entire
experience.
In turn, Nurse and Fleming point out that the growth of
historical perception can be much aided by examining the media accounts,
print and visual of various antiwar demonstrations.
To flesh out the more abstract treatments, there is a certain
poignancy to be found in one article titled "We Must Not Let Them Forget
Vietnam."

It was written by the late Charles DeBenedetti and published

in January, 1988.
DeBenedetti died January 27, 1987 while a Professor of
Specialist History at the University of Toledo in Ohio.

He was

considered a specialist in the history of the peace movement.
In 1961, DeBenedetti was eighteen years old and a student at
Loyola University of Chicago.

He received a 2-s deferment, married and

pursued graduate studies in history.
movement.

He then worked in the peace
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He wrote:
While working against Washington's war for the unwinnable, I gained
an entirely different understanding of the place of irrationality in
modern American history.
I decided that political irrationality was
not so much a peculiar feature of mass social movements as it was an
expression of unrestrained governmental power.
DeBenedetti began teaching a course on "The U.S. and Vietnam" a
few years before his death.

He wrote that one student, a Vietnam

veteran, asked that younger, non-vet students, not be allowed to forget
the war.

"Don't let them forget, don't ever,1"let them forget," the vet

told Debenedetti. 6
In a more extensive approach with many more additional insights
"What Should We Tell Our Children About Vietnam?" was the title of a
magazine article written for American Herita~e by Bill Mccloud and
published in 1988. 7

Several journalists were among those who replied to

McCloud's question.

Here are their partial answers:

Michael Arlen:
In the end what I urge on your students is to live their lives in
such a way that they not be burdened by what strikes me as
democracy's most notable drawback--namely the seeming tendency of
democratic peoples to be surprised by life. 8
Peter Braestrup:
I suggest that there are five things a junior high-school student
should understand about the Vietnam War.
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

The war was fought for a noble cause--to defend South Vietnam
from a Communist takeover.
Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon tried to fight the war "on
the cheap."
American troops at least until President Nixon began troop
withdrawals in 1969, fought as well as (or better than) their
elders in World War II or Korea.
The South Vietnamese ally was caught up in a civil war--abetted
by outsiders from North Vietnam.
Geography and political constraints made an allied victory
impossible under the ground rules of 1965-73. 9

so
Malcolme Browne:
Maybe the lesson of Vietnam was this:
If you really want to win a
war, you're best off fighting it on your own, with as little help
from outside as possible . . . . For a junior high student (or anyone
else) I think the best prescription is to study history, history,
and more history_lO
Philip Caputo:
The two most important things for today's junior high school
students to understand about the Vietnam War are:
1.

2.

The United States learned in Vietnam that there are limits to
its power and that to exceed those limits invites tragic
consequences.
The American soldiers who fought in the war did so out of sense
of duty to their country, but their country betrayed them bv
sending them to an unwinnable war. 11

Jack Foisie:
I think that young Americans ought to be told the unvarnished truth
about the American performance in Vietnam--militarily and
politically--even though much of it is unpleasant. 12
John Hersey:
It seems to me that the lessons of Vietnam spread far beyond the
borders of that country:
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

War is no way to solve problems between nations.
Sophisticated weapons don't win wars:
the spirit and
determination of the people who fight are what determine the
outcome.
It is a mistake to think of communism as being one and the same
in every country where it appears.
We need to have more concern for poverty and hardship and
sickness and backwardness of education in underdeveloped
countries.
So long as we preserve here at home the remarkable freedoms
bequeathed to us by our Constitution and Bill of Rights, we have
nothing to fear from communism. 13

Marvin Kalb:
First the political and military leaders of the U.S. cannot and must
not lie to the American people about their major security concerns.
Second, no controversial policy can ever succeed without the support
of the American people.
Third, no American must ever be called upon
to sacrifice his life for a cause that is poorly understood,
blurred, or deceptively explained by the administration. 14
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Donald Oberdorfer, Jr.:
Whether because t-he task was impossible from the start or bec,mse it
was poorly executed or because in the end the American people lost
confidence and terminated support--and I think there were elements
of all three--the Vietnam War was a monumental failure of a giant
scale national project. 15
Pierre Salinger:
Students should understand that our participation in Vietnam
drastically changed the attitude of Americans about participating in
overseas wars. 1 6
William Tuohy:
The most important thing for your students to understand about the
Vietnam War is the limitation on the use of American power abroad. 17
The trenchant observations and judgments made by these journalists in
their responses to William McCloud are, to some extent understandable,
in contrast to the less forthright and even weaker treatments in the
textbooks.

The Vietnam War in American History Textbooks
While textbook teaching has been often decried and even
castigated on occasion, social studies and history classrooms still
heavily rely on it.

To be sure creative teachers can and do supplement

this source with a variety of other media projects, e.g., films, slides,
tapes, VCRs, newspapers, periodicals and interviews with veterans, where
these are available.

However, we are only too aware of time and space

constraints so that textbooks do remain a very important source of
historical information for young Americans.
Fleming and Nurse 18 have recently researched and evaluated
developments in the treatment of the Vietnam War in American history
textbooks.

As might be expected with the passage of time, better
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perspectives and better treatments developed.

More concretely, in May

1982, before they did their own review of textbooks published in 1978
and 1979, they took note of the work of Frances Fitzgerald and the study
done by William L. Griffin and John Marciano.
far-ranging work entitled America Revised:
Twentieth Century (1979).

Fitzgerald's was a more

History Schoolbooks in the

It is no doubt because of its scope better

known than Marciano and Griffin's, which was more narrowly focused.
Teachin~ the Vietnam War:

A Critical Examination of School Texts and

Interpretive Comparative History Utilizin& the Penta~on Papers and Other
Documents, also in 1979.

Both these endeavors, with differing degrees

of emphasis, endorsed the view of henry Steele Commager on the pervasive
role of nationalism in the preparation and writing of history textbooks.
There is one bias, one prejudice, one obsession, so pervasive and so
powerful that it deserves special consideration nationalism.
History, which should be the most cosmopolitan of studies, most
catholic in its sympathies, most ecumenical in its interests, has,
in the past century and a half become an instrument of nationalism.
Nationalism is, no doubt, the most powerful force in modern history,
and it is hardly surprising that it should have captured
historiography and enslaved historians. 19
In the same tenor, the Billington Committee of the American
Historical Association had stated in 1966, that "nationalistic bias is
as persistent in today's schoolbooks [referring to texts of the early
1960s] as in those used a generation ago. 1120

However, they concluded it

was not as blatant as the deliberate distortions of many nineteenthcentury historians and their nationalistic fervors.
Thus, it is refreshing to note that the National Science
Foundation's Project Span in 1980 took this view:

"Today's texts tend

to be less chauvinistic and less narrowly nationalistic.

Controversial
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topics are still treated cautiously but they are treated, and that has
not always been the case." 21
Fleming and Nurse go on to proffer the same valuable
generalizations on the basis of the ten texts they investigated (all
came out between 1977 and 1981).

As might be expected, the textbooks

dealt primarily with the military and political sides of Vietnam War, to
the neglect of what to Fitzgerald were very important understandings of
Vietnamese history and culture.

They also seemed to play down the

struggle between "doves" and "hawks" over moral issues such as the Kent
State shooting, the massacre at My Lai and chemical warfare, for
example.
While Fleming and Nurse agree about the neglect of different
moral issues, they did find that all the textbooks did deal with the
anti-war protest and most of them did bring in the Penta&on Papers.
They state their conclusions in the 1982 study in this wise:
Most of the textbooks in our study offer a too sketchy account of
the Vietnam War. However, the deficiencies of the narratives are
not those of distortion, dishonesty, inaccuracy, or bias. The
problem tends to be the neglect of certain key topics.
This
omission is particularly true of war aims, moral controversies and
"lessons" of the war.
This deficiency can be explained, in part, by
the limitations of space available to authors, which is an inherent
problem for all survey textbooks.
In essence, therefore, the
changes made by Fitzgerald's sweeping study, as well as those of
Griffin/Marciano (directed against older textbook editions) continue
to have considerable validity. However, the more recent textbooks
are more objective and more accurate, and they show a marked
domination in the degree of nationalistic bias. 22
In 1988, Fleming and Nurse updated their study with what they
felt was a really representative cross-section of textbooks in national
use.

They investigated how these recent textbooks handled a number of

key topics regarding the Vietnam War, such as the Geneva Agreement of
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1954, the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the anti-war movement, war aims, the
legacy of the war, and Vietnamese culture.

Their conclusions are

encouraging; progress seems to have been definitely made.
Overall, the mid-1980s textbooks provide improved treatment of
the war in Vietnam.

They generally point out the United States' errors

and tackle controversial topics such as the Gulf of Tonkin incident and
our support of the Ngo Dinh Hiem.
They still ignore the culture of Vietnam, however, but have improved
their discussion of the costs of the war, particularly with respect
to reexamining the role of the United States in the world.
Just as
the American public appears to be taking a new look at the war in
Vietnam, so history textbooks seem gradually to be presenting a new
"truth." 23
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The interpretation of the Tet offensive of 1968 continues to be
contested, as then, so now by "hawks" and "doves" in varying degrees but
persistently.

This study has attempted to probe this problem in the

context of the entire war:

with special concern for teaching of

American history in the junior high and high school grades.
The meaning of Tet was fought over recently by such luminaries
as Norman Podhoretz and Noam Chomsky.

On the one hand, Podhoretz sees

Tet as the time when Congress, the people and the media gave up on the
Vietnam War.

On the other hand, Chomsky sees its aftermath as showing

forth the reliance of American forces on increasingly violent tactics
(My Lai for example).
Much ink has been spilt on speculation as to how such a military
defeat at Tet has been changed into a decisive strategic/political
victory for the North Vietnamese.
Apart from the stark record that the Vietnamese--both North and
South--bore the brunt of the conflict, Americans naturally wish to
assess the importance of Tet and the Vietnam War for our people,
especially for our heirs and beneficiaries.
arguments about Tet go on.

Consequently, American

Notwithstanding, reactions by our media

people and reactions to them have much to teach us and our children.
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To
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what extent is Tet a victory misunderstood?

The debate goes on in all

our classrooms.
With regard to the ten core interviews with the on-the-scene
correspondents, some tentative conclusions seem to be in order.
were asked five questions.
1.

They

They are repeated here:

Was the news coverage of the Tet military action reliable enough to
be used by future teachers, students and historians?

If not, why

not?
There were yes answers from seven respondents.
The answers from three were qualified and entered some reservations.
2.

Was there accurate coverage during Tet of President Johnson and his
administration in Washington, D.C. and in Vietnam?

If not, why not?

"No" was the answer from three.
"Don't know" was the answer from two.
Two said "yes" to Vietnam coverage.
both Washington, D.C. and Vietnam.
3.

Two others answered "yes" for
One said "yes" and "no."

What mistakes were made during Tet by the news media in Vietnam and
Washington?
The answers were varied as these examples show:
•

Some coverage suggested the Communist offensive as being more
successful than it actually was.

•

The primary mistake was not reporting Tet as a tactical disaster
for the North Vietnamese.

•

Executions at Hue got little play.

•

Many mistakes and misunderst;::ndings of the historical forces at
work fail -d to realize there was military disaster over there
(for the North Vietnamese).

58

Little documentation on what the North Vietnamese did.
•

Mechanical mistakes as on any big breaking story.

•

The North Vietnamese atrocities were under reported; initial
judgments were later proved wrong.

4.

•

Not knowingly inaccurate.

•

Not enough focus on city invasions.

Was Peter Braestrup accurate in his accusations of President
Johnson's alleged "willy nilly" conduct before and during Tet?
Two answered "Don't know."
One answered "somewhat."
Seven responded "yes."

5.

Are the available radio, TV tapes and news accounts, periodicals and
books on Tet accurate enough for use today by students, teachers,
and scholars?

If not, why not?

"Yes" was the answer from seven.
"Mixed" was one answer and the respondent wanted all sides examined.
One said there was "some sensationalism."
One said the TV coverage was accurate and usable.
A pattern that seems to emerge from the above analysis is that
students, teachers, and scholars can trust the historical accounts of
this water-shed battle, Tet, and of the Vietnam War in general, that
have been based on the materials generated by the journalists and their
media colleagues.

The added perspectives of eighteen years give their

views a genuine maturity.
At the same time initial mistakes and some inaccuracies are
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adverted to and admitted with appropriate qualifiers that really serves
to support the overall veracity and integrity of the correspondents.
Thus, these interviews in fine go counter to the occasional allegations
that the media especially after Tet turned military victory into
political defeat.

Their accounts, of course, were variously interpreted

by "hawks" and "doves."
This author seeks now to offer his own response to the questions
that were asked of and answered by ten key journalists who covered
Vietnam:
1.

Was the news coverage of the Tet military action reliable

enough to be used by future teachers, students and historians?

If not,

why not?
Author's response:

It can be used.

However, it would be well

for any user to be mindful of the admonitions from Philip Knightley.
Knightley's very perceptive interpretation of television
coverage of the Vietnam war is relevant.
Years of television news of the war have left viewers with a
blur of images consisting mainly of helicopters landing in jungle
clearings, soldiers charging into undergrowth, wounded being loaded
onto helicopters, artillery and mortar fire, air strikes on distant
targets, napalm canisters turning slowly in the sky, and a
breathless correspondent poking a stick microphone under an army
officer's nose and asking, "What's happening up there, Colonel?"
(The only honest answer came in 1972, from a captain on Highway 13.
"I wish the hell I knew," he said.) The networks claimed the combat
footage was what the public wanted; that concentrating on combat
prevented the film's being out of date if it was delayed in
transmission; that it was difficult to shoot anything other than
combat film when only three or four minutes were available in the
average news program for events in Vietnam; and that the illusion of
American progress created by combat footage shot from only one side
was balanced by what the correspondent had to say.
Knightley argues that the network claims are false.

He contends

that the aforementioned combat footage did not adequately convey all
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aspects of combat.

This author is a World War II infantry combat

veteran and agrees with Knightley.
The author also is in strong agreement with this summary by
Knightley:
American television executives showed too little courage in
their approach to Vietnam. They followed each other into paths the
army had chosen for them. They saw the war as "an American war in
Asia--and that's the only story the American audience is interested
in," and they let other, equally important, aspects of Vietnam go
uncovered.
This author has not ever uncovered legitimate evidence that
there was deliberate and intentional distortions in the filming or
reporting of the Tet battles.

Major inaccuracies apparently were

quickly identified and corrected.
Mistakes were made in selectivity, editing, and eventual
placement of photos, film and news stories.

These mistakes must be

considered in the larger context of journalism realities.
2.

Was there accurate coverage during Tet of President Johnson

and his administration in Washington, D. C. and in Vietnam.

If not, why

not?
The news, in this author's opinion, was accurately reported.
Dozens of books over the years have chronicled the lies and obfuscations
of Johnson and his administration.

Reporters soon became distrustful of

Johnson and his people both in Washington and in Vietnam.

When

possible, reporters challenged Johnson and his people as to the facts
and the veracity of their statements.
3.

What mistakes were made during Tet by the news media in

Vietnam and Washington?
At times, the journalists were not aggressive or hard-charging
enough.

They were not skeptical enough nor did they dig deep enough.
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And editors in both print and TV were sometimes "sloppy" and did not
challenge their own people to be accurate and complete.
There were certainly mistakes in the early days of Tet that led
to the general impression that the U.S. had suffered a major military
defeat.

Time and subsequent events have proved this was not so.

The

mistakes were not intentional and often of an accidental nature.
4.

Was Peter Braestrup accurate in his accusations of President

Johnson's alleged "willy nilly" conduct before and during Tet?
Yes, Braestrup was accurate for the following reasons with which
this author concurs.
1.

Six months prior to the Tet attacks, he orchestrated a

"progress" campaign; to shore up public support, he and his subordinates
presented an optimistic view of the Administration's limited war of
attrition in Vietnam.
2.

He was warned by the military from Saigon that Hanoi was

planning a big battle, but did not warn his fellow Americans.

He only

stressed his quest for Peace."
3.

When Tet did come, he gave a hasty reaction, not on

television, and left detailed explanations to his aides.
4.

He took major retaliations against the enemy.

5.

It was a month after Tet that Johnson announced a new

bombing pause, his withdrawal from the 1968 presidential race and a new
peace offer.
6.

Johnson did not give the media or the public a credible

coherent explanation.
5.

Are the available radio, TV tapes and news accounts,
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periodicals and books on Tet accurate enough for use today by students,
teachers and scholars?

If not, why not.

Yes, with some qualifications.

Again, scholars, teachers and

students today will have to exercise some caution in accepting and
understanding materials.
This entire study underscores the importance of comprehending
how the media people do and do not function in a crisis.
To further recapitulate the constant crisis situation in which
reporters and photographers found themselves in this most photographed
of all American wars it is important to summarize the challenges under
which they worked.
In the early 1960s, there was other enormous pressure on
journalists here and in Vietnam from U.S. leaders and politicians "to
get on our team."
almost treasonous.

Unfavorable news reports from Vietnam were considered
On of the best accounts of this is from Knightley:

Not it was Time's turn to join the team. In August 1963,
Charles Mohr, the magazine's chief correspondent in South-East Asia,
and Merton Perry, who had been a Time stringer in Saigon since 1962,
wrote, at the request of the head office, a long story on the Saigon
correspondents and their battle with the American mission and an
even longer round-up of the war situation. The latter began: "The
war in Vietnam is being lost." When it appeared in Time, this line
had disappeared. Things were going well in Vietnam, the article
said, and "government troops are fighting better than ever." The
article on the Saigon press corps did not appear, but on September
20 another article was published. It was a vicious attack on the
correspondents, and it began: "For all the light it shed, the news
that U.S. newspaper readers got from Saigon might just as well have
been printed in Vietnamese." The article accused the correspondents
of pooling "their convictions, information, misinformation and
grievances," of becoming themselves "a part of the Vietnam's
confusion," and of producing material that was "prone to
distortions."
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When the article appeared, Time's chief of correspondents,
Richard Clurman, who had tried to have it stopped, called Mohr to
placate him. Mohr said that unless he could have equal space to
reply personally . . . , he would resign. Time would not agree to
this, so Mohr and Perry went.
Washington kept up the pressure. News reports from Vietnam,
said Pierre Salinger, the White House press secretary, were
emotional and inaccurate. As a stream of highly regarded reporters
and special writers went out to Vietnam, including several Second
World War correspondents, and the columnist Joseph Alsop. All
decided that the war was going well. Frank Conniff, a Hearst
writer, blamed the pessimistic reporting on American editors. The
fact that young reporters, most of them in their twenties, had been
assigned to report an involved story reflected little credit on the
prescience of their employers, he wrote. President Kennedy felt the
same way, and he tried to get rid of his particular bete noire,
David Halberstam, by asking the New York Times' publisher, "Punch"
Sulzberger, to reassign him. Sulzberger not only refused to do so,
but also cancelled a two-week holiday Halberstam was about to take,
in case that it should appear that the Times had yielded to
Kennedy's pressure. So the impression of these early years of
Vietnam is of courageous and skilled correspondents fighting a long
and determined action for the right to report the war as they saw
it.
There is only one flaw in this: the correspondents were not
questioning the American intervention itself, but only its
effectiveness. Most correspondents, despite what Washington thought
about them, were just as interested in seeing the United States win
the war as was the Pentagon. What the correspondents questioned was
not American policy, but the tactics used to implement that policy,
in particular the backing of Deim as the "white hope" of Vietnam.
"We would have liked nothing better than to believe that the war was
going well, and that it would eventually be won," Halberstam wrote
later. "But it was impossible to believe these things without
denying the evidence of our senses." Mohr was embarrassed when he
found that his stand against Time had made him something of an antiwar hero. "Everyone thought I left because I was against the war.
I just thought it wasn't working. I didn't come to think of it as
immoral until the very end."
A recent summary in 1991 by the redoubtable long-time New York
Times reporter, columnist and editor, James Reston recapitulates with
forthright cogency the considered judgment of many on the role of the
reporters of Vietnam:
They were vilified for their pains, denounced by the government,
sometimes mistrusted by their own editors, condemned by some of
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their own colleagues in Washington, and even blamed by some
officials for the nation's final humiliation and defeat. I thought
this was unfair and still believe that these reporters, including
the men with their television cameras on the battlefield, did a
better job under more difficult circumstances than any other band of
war correspondents in my time.
Reston noted again how early on the White House and its
bureaucracy, namely President Kennedy and his advisers, including such
men as the militant Joseph Alsop tried to persuade the publisher of the
New York Times, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger to do something about the
reporting of David Halberstam.
sent home.

They, in fact, urged strongly that he be

However, Sulzberger, fortunately for the freedom of

information position, stood his ground and encouraged Halberstam to keep
on.

Reston again:
Halberstam was a human lie detector, with an explosive temper, a
profane vocabulary, a talent for getting into brawls, and the
physique to muscle out of them. Sheehan was a gentler sort. His
tours of the blasted Vietnam villages on either side of the line
reduced him to tears, and he was so admiring of Colonel Vann's
courage and determination to tell the truth that he spent seventeen
years after the war writing a book about him--A Bri~ht Shinin& Lie
which won the Pulitzer Prize. Kennedy was not the only one who
complained about Sheehan and Halberstam.
In a quandary as an editor back in the States, Reston even

proposed that the New York Times print side-by-side the regularly
contradictory unofficial and official reports from Vietnam.
Nobody was quite satisfied with this fifty-fifty display. The
officials in Washington complained that we were questioning their
judgment, which of course we were, and even members of our own staff
thought we couldn't make up our minds.
In view of these swirling controversies, Reston decided to go to
Vietnam again to personally observe the reporters, military and
civilian, at work.

His vivid account of the "Five O'Clock Follies"

presents a very telling set of insights.
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These were presided over by Harold Kaplan, an intelligent and
amiable official with a long Filipino cigar in his teeth. The
briefings usually produced between twelve and fifteen single-spaced
pages of reports on the day's events, for this was not one war but
sixty-three different wars in different provinces and offshore in
the China Sea. Kaplan permitted some ragging questions for about
fifteen minutes, all ending at about six o'clock in a scoreless tie.
Then began the tedious task of checking the reports and trying to
transmit the stories to New York over a communications system that,
in the opinion of the reporters, justified the Vietnamese rebellion
against the French.
Reston was clearly and, in the author's view justifiably
gratified by the military's policy of permitting reporters to get to the
battle scene, even offering transportation and he was also impressed
with how the reporters had gained the confidence of officers and men on
the battlefield.

He further extolled the work of the TV reporters and

their cameras and graphically describes their impact.
I have tossed a few slurs at television in these pages, but I have
to say that its cameras brought the human tragedy of the Vietnam War
home to the American people more vividly than the newspapers could
describe it. They showed the brutality of the Communists in the
villages, but it was left to Morely Safer of CBS to show on film
U.S. Marines setting fire to the thatched peasant houses of the
villagers. This dramatized what was happening not only to the enemy
but also to our own men, and it raised such an uproar at home that
the marine command ordered a stop to the practice.
Reston's fulsome praise of the journalist's work, both in print
and non-print was not limited to the New York Times people, though he
knew them best.
outstanding job:

He also singled out among the many who did such an
Peter Arnett, of the A.P., Ed Morgan of ABC, Ward Just

of the Washington Post and the ubiquitous Frances Fitzgerald of the New
Yorker.

His summation of the difficulties under which all involved

worked are deeply perceptive.
The war in Vietnam was so alien to the American experience and such
a tangle of conflicting cultures, interest, memories, religions, and
personal, regional, and tribal ambitions that it defied precise
definition and was almost beyond comprehension.

66
Even the words normally used to describe a war were misleading.
It was not a war in the usual sense. It was a series of violent
actions, some rather like Al Capone's gang raids in Chicago, some
like the frontier skirmishes in the French and Indian War, still
others like the savage encounters between the Americans and the
Japanese in the Pacific island caves of 1945--all this with the
Strategic Air Command, of all things, bombing guerrillas, of all
people, in tunnels in the Vietnamese forests, of all places.
It really needed a new vocabulary, Vietnam was not a nation but
a physical and strategic entity broken into conspiratorial families,
clans, sects, hamlets, and regions by many generations of Mandarin,
French, Japanese, and religious influence.
In that situation, it was almost impossible to perform the
reporting function of reducing diversity to identity. All you could
do was try to illustrate just how complex human political and
military relations were.
When he returned home with all these puzzlements fermenting in
his mind, Reston proceeded to defend his fellows vigorously against the
chronic complaints from administration officials about the negative
reporting from Vietnam.

Soon after he wrote that "with the bombing of

targets on the outskirts of Hanoi and Haiphong it (the Johnson
administration] had now done almost everything it said it wouldn't do,
except bomb China."
He continues in the most personal way an account of his
confrontation with the beleaguered President Lyndon Johnson.
When I got home, I heard the same complaints from administration
officials about "negative reporting" out of Saigon, and did
everything I could to defend the integrity and accuracy of my
colleagues in Saigon. I wrote that the Johnson administration might
finally get over its agony in Vietnam, but it would probably never
regain the people's confidence in its judgment and veracity. With
the bombing of targets on the outskirts of Hanoi and Haiphong, it
had now done almost everything it said it wouldn't do, except bomb
China. It said it was not seeking a military solution to the war,
and it was obviously seeking precisely that; it said it was there
merely to help a legitimate government defend itself, and it ended
up by supporting a military clique that was not a government, not
legitimate, and not really defending itself.
The president called me to the White House and gave me "the
works." He denounced my colleagues in Saigon in terms I could
hardly bear after my trip, and he asked me, "Why don't you get on
the team? You have only one president. I had heard it all before
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and said I thought he was trying to save face. He stood up and
showed me to the door. "I'm not trying to save my face," he said,
"I'm trying to .save my ass."
These are some lessons our children and their teachers can learn from
this welter of conflicting charges and countercharges.
As John McDonough, a free-lance writer, pithily stated it in the
Chica&o Tribune, Tempo Section on May 26, 1990:
To a reporter, war is always the good old days. Peace may have
given us record military budgets and too many journalism students.
But only war can build a five-star general or a legendary
correspondent. Maybe this is why those who write the proverbial
"first drafts of history" as war correspondents often return to
write the second as historians.
One such is Morley Safer who so incensed President Johnson with
his on the scene Vietnam reports.

In his "Flashbacks:

One Returning to

Vietnam," he said that Vietnam was uniquely a follow-up to World War II.
The witnesses to WWII see it all . . . from the disillusionment of
the '20s that shaped their first world views through the moral
certainties of Vietnam that challenged their prestige as senior
journalists.
Eric Sevareid is another such witness, since he was in all the
major events for CBS from the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939 until the
end of the war in Vietnam.

Says Sevareid:

There was an epic irony here. We became the victim of our own
victory. This is always the dilemma of a great power. You
oscillate from Munichs to Vietnams. You fail to use power when you
should. Then you become too quick to use it when you shouldn't.
It's the misery of the mighty.
On the other side of the fence, senior correspondents of the
stature of Richard C. Hottelet and Larry Le Suer, keenly recollecting
Chamberlain and Munich were strenuously opposed to any form of
appeasement.

It was, of course, the younger generation of reporters

such as Safer that used the camera so successfully to belie official
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reports of military actions, e.g., the outrageous burning of the village
at Cam Ne.

The debate they launched, especially when such influential

powerhouses as Eric Sevareid and Walter Cronkite came aboard, is now
history.

It would not be long before Lyndon B. Johnson would withdraw

from the presidential race.
The conclusions drawn by the Lessons of the Vietnam War, the
previously cited modular textbook that emerged from the Center for
Social Studies Education at Pittsburgh are echoed in this study.
Nations have long memories. Vietnam will continue to have a
powerful influence on American foreign policy until some other
cataclysmic event replaces it. It is therefore urgent that we study
and learn from it. In doing this, we must remember that history
does not yield precise, explicit answers to today's most pressing
questions. Indeed, when used improperly, history is a mischievous
guide. We should we wary of those ,,ho justify present-day
commitments and strategies on the basis of what was done or not done
in Vietnam.
On the other hand, careful analysis of how we got into Vietnam
and why we failed can provide vital perspectives on today's
problems. It can educate us about who we are and how we deal with
other peoples and can offer cautionary principles, such as those
cited above, that can help guide our leaders in making decisions.
The past is indeed prologue, and we cannot begin to deal with
today's most pressing issues without coming to terms with the
longest and most divisive war the nation has fought.
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Their names are not to be found engraved on the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial wall in Washington, D.C.

Nor most anywhere today.

For they died working as journalists covering a war that was both
hated and misunderstood.

They perished, too, in Laos and Cambodia.

Their graves are scattered and the bodies of some still have not
been located, but now they must be presumed dead.
The known who died in Vietnam are:
Michael Y. Birch

Free Lance

John L. Cantwell

Time-Life

Sam Castan

Look magazine

Dickey Chapelle

Free Lance

Charles Challapah

Free Lance

Charles Eggleston

UPI

Robert J. Ellison

Free Lance

Ignacio Ezcurra

Free Lance

Bernard B. Fall

Free Lance

Ronald D. Gallagher

Free Lance

Bernard Kolenberg

AP

Ronald B. Laramy

Reuters

Hiromichi Mine

UPI

Huynh Thanh My

AP

Oliver Noonan

AP

Bruce Pigott

Reuters

Jerry Rose

Free Lance

Tatsuo Sakai

Nihon Keizai Shimbun

Paul Savanuck

Stars and Stri:ges
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Philippa Schuyler

Manchester Union Leader

Francois Sully

Newsweek

Pieter Ronald Van Thirl

Free Lance

Reported dead in Laos were:
Larry Burrows

Life

Henri Huet

AP

Kent Potter

UPI

Keisaburo Shimamoto

Newsweek

Killed in Cambodia were:
Frank Frosch

UPI

Gerald Miller

CBS

Koichi Sawada

UPI

George Syvertsen

CBS

It is ironic that only one journalist is not listed missing in
Vietnam itself.

He is Alexander Shimkin of Newsweek.

Still missing and now presumed dead somewhere in Cambodia are:
Claud Arpin

Newsweek

Dieter Bellendorf

NBS

Gilles Caron

Gamma Agency of Paris

Roger Colne

NBC

Sean Flynn

Time

Georg Gensluckner

Free Lance

Welles Hagen

NBC

Guy Hannoteaux

L'Express

Alan Hirons

UPI

Taizo Ichinose

Free Lance
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Tomaharu Ishi

CBS

Akira Kusaka

Fuji Television

Richard A Martin

Free Lance

Willy Mettler

Free Lance

Terry Reynolds

UPI

Kojiro Sakai

CBS

Dana Stone

CBS

Toshiihi Suzuki

Nippon Dempa News

Yujiro Takagi

Fuji Television

Takeshi Yanagisawa

Nippon Dempa News

Yoshihiko Yurigo

Nippon Dempa News

Yoshihko Waku

NBC

They total 53.
presumed dead.

Thirty are known dead and 23 must now be

They must be acknowledged in any serious analysis of the

coverage of the Vietnam war.

This study focuses on the Tet offensive coverage

that lasted approximately two months.

The sacrifices made by journalists

throughout the war also deserve recognition here.
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